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The Right to Plea Bargain With Competent Counsel
After Cooper and Frye: Is the Supreme Court
Making the Ordinary Criminal Process "Too Long,
Too Expensive, and Unpredictable ... in Pursuit of
Perfect Justice"?
Bruce A. Green*
INTRODUCTION
The ordinary criminal process has become too long, too expen-
sive, and unpredictable, in no small part as a consequence of
an intricate federal Code of Criminal Procedure imposed on
the States by the Supreme Court in pursuit of perfect justice.
See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929 (1965). The Court now
moves to bring perfection to the alternative in which prosecu-
tors and defendants have sought relief Today's opinions deal
with only two aspects of counsel's plea-bargaining inadequacy,
and leave other aspects (who knows what they might be?) to be
worked out in further constitutional litigation that will burden
the criminal process.'
"[T]oo long, too expensive, and unpredictable."2 That is how Jus-
tice Scalia described "the ordinary criminal process"' in a dissent-
ing opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas.
Justice Scalia blamed the length, cost, and unpredictability of
criminal proceedings not on the intrinsic nature of adjudication
but on the constitutional jurisprudence underlying the criminal
process, which he depicted as unnecessarily intricate and unduly
burdensome. One might infer, given their understanding, that
these Justices will not only interpret constitutional provisions
* Louis Stein Chair and Director, Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law.
1. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391-98 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 1391 (emphasis added).
3 Id
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narrowly in criminal cases but, given the chance, will trim back
constitutional protections that they believe earlier decisions be-
nightedly "imposed on the States ... in pursuit of perfect justice.'
Justice Scalia's criticism of modern constitutional criminal pro-
cedure came in 2012 in one of two companion cases involving crim-
inal defendants' Sixth Amendment right to competent counsel. By
a 5-4 margin in both Lafler v. Cooper' and Missouri v. Frye,' the
Court held in favor of a criminal defendant who was deprived of a
favorable plea offer because of his lawyer's professional lapse. The
cases occasioned doctrinal disagreement about whether the Sixth
Amendment offers a cure when a defendant misses out on a favor-
able plea bargain because his lawyer failed to meet professional
standards. But beneath this question, for Justice Scalia, was a
more fundamental one: whether constitutional decisions, including
these two, place excessive demands on the criminal process.
Justice Scalia's prefatory observations should not be dismissed
as mere hyperbole in a single dissent. They appear quite literally
to be the starting point for how three conservative Justices ap-
proach criminal procedure adjudication generally. If these Justic-
es' fundamental assumptions about the criminal process are
wrong or exaggerated, then the legitimacy of their basic approach
to decision-making in this important area of law is suspect.
This essay unpacks and analyzes Justice Scalia's observations
and ultimately takes issue with them in various respects. First,
the essay challenges Justice Scalia's assumption that defendants
take refuge in plea bargaining as an alternative to criminal trials
because of the intricacies of constitutional procedures. On the
contrary, guilty pleas have become the ordinary means of resolv-
ing criminal cases, and defendants' waivers of other constitutional
rights have also become commonplace, not because the Court is
procedurally too demanding but because it has been under-
protective; its decisions have constructed a system of waivers in
which prosecutors use harsh punishment as leverage to compel
4. Id. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), which held that defense coun-
sel's erroneous advice about the deportation consequences of the defendant's guilty plea
violated the right to competent representation, Justice Scalia opened his dissent with simi-
lar concern about the Court's pursuit of perfection. Id. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In
the best of all possible worlds, criminal defendants contemplating a guilty plea ought to be
advised of all serious collateral consequences of conviction, and surely ought not to be mis-
advised. The Constitution, however, is not an all-purpose tool for judicial construction of a
perfect world. . . .").
5. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
6. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
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defendants to forgo procedural protections. Second, this essay
raises doubts as to whether the two decisions to which Justice
Scalia dissented either impose or invite new procedural burdens.
Finally, this essay questions Justice Scalia's premise that consti-
tutional decisions in general burden the criminal process, and also
questions the Justice's reliance on Judge Henry Friendly's 1965
article to support this premise.' The great twentieth century ju-
rist, for whom Chief Justice Roberts clerked, did not disparage
procedural protections in criminal cases, as does Justice Scalia,
but simply called attention to the need for constitutional decision-
making to leave room for state legislative innovation in this field.
I. THE CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL PROCESS: TOWARD A SYSTEM OF
WAIVERS
The ordinary criminal process has become too long, too expen-
sive, and unpredictable, in no small part as a consequence of
an intricate federal Code of Criminal Procedure imposed on
the States by this Court. . . . [Plea bargaining is] the alterna-
tive in which ... defendants have sought relief 8
One tends to think of the criminal process as dominated by tri-
als and of criminal defense lawyers as the quintessential trial
lawyers, which is how they are portrayed on television. But more
of a criminal defense lawyer's time is spent in what is loosely de-
scribed as the plea bargaining process than in the trial process.
That is because most criminal cases culminate in a guilty plea ra-
ther than a trial, and most guilty pleas are the product of an
agreement in which the defendant receives something in ex-
change-for example, the prosecutor drops or reduces some of the
charges or makes a favorable sentencing recommendation. As
Justice Kennedy observed in his opinion for the Court in Cooper,
"the reality [is] that criminal justice today is for the most part a
system of pleas, not a system of trials."' In many cases, no real
bargaining occurs because prosecutors have enough leverage to
make a "take it or leave it" plea offer. Defendants, including some
who are innocent, ordinarily take the offer, because the stakes are
so high: the risk of a conviction after trial is unacceptable given
7. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 929 (1965).
8. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1391-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 1388.
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the relative harshness of the prison sentence that would follow.'o
The academic literature on this process is extensive, if by .no
means exhaustive." Commentators overwhelmingly agree that
the law governing plea bargaining is insufficiently developed to
protect against coercion, conviction of the innocent, and other un-
fairness to the accused. 2
10. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Myth of Factual Innocence, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
663 (2007); Brandon J. Lester, System Failure: The Case for Supplanting Negotiation with
Mediation in Plea Bargaining, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 563 (2005); Ronald F.
Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 79 (2005); see also ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND
THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2009).
11. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING (1978); Stephanos
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004); Law-
rence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 247
(1979); Douglas G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecu-
torial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37; Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bar-
gaining and Social Welfare, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 749 (1983); Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargain-
ing: A Critic's Rejoinder, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 555 (1979); John H. Langbein, Understand-
ing the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 261 (1979); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43
(1988); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733 .(1980);
Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471,
1475-76 (1993). Albert Alschuler has been the leading contributor to this literature. See,
e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alterna-
tives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983); Albert W. Alschuler,
Plea Bargaining and its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979); Albert W. Alschuler, The
Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975); Albert
W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968).
12. See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Prob-
lem of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429 (2011); Russell D. Covey, Plea
Bargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV.595 (2013) (advocating pre-plea
Brady disclosure); John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and
Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 488 (2001); Gifford, supra note 11, at 96 (proposing
"an administrative model for determining guilty plea concessions"); Susan R. Klein, Moni-
toring the Plea Process, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 559 (2013) (proposing procedural rules and internal
prosecutorial guidelines to regulate plea bargaining); Maximo Langer, Rethinking Plea
Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223 (2006) (proposing procedural reforms to make plea bar-
gaining fairer); Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in
Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV. 887 (1980); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accu-
racy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1989); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 2009 (1992) ("With trials in open court and
deserved sentences imposed by a neutral factfinder, we protect the due process right to an
adversarial trial, minimize the risk of unjust conviction of the innocent, and at the same
time further the public interest in effective law enforcement and adequate punishment of
the guilty. But plea negotiation simultaneously undercuts all of these interests. The af-
fected parties are represented by agents who have inadequate incentives for proper perfor-
mance; prospects for effective monitoring are limited or nonexistent; and the dynamics of
negotiation can create irresistible pressure for defendants falsely to condemn themselves.");
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
738
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Supreme Court decisions deserve much of the blame for turning
criminal justice into a process dominated not by trials following
the blueprint of the Sixth Amendment, 13 but by guilty pleas, most
of which are the product of a plea agreement, if not a meaningful
plea negotiation.14 For prosecutors, a plea bargain may provide
escape from the length, expense or unpredictability of criminal
trials occasioned in part by constitutional protections,'" but for
defendants it is primarily an escape from more severe, and argua-
bly excessive, punishment.1 6 The Court has said that there is al-
most no limit to how long an adult defendant may be imprisoned
for any particular crime, even a comparatively trivial one.' 7 Fur-
ther, the Court has said that there is essentially no constraint on
a prosecutor's power to induce a defendant to plead guilty by first
1950 (1992) (the law governing plea bargaining "might be adjusted in ways that (if only at
the margin) facilitate the separation of innocent defendants from guilty ones at the bar-
gaining stage"). But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining is a Shadow Market, 51
DUQ. L. REV. 551 (2013).
13. The Sixth Amendment elaborates trial rights and does not explicitly contemplate
the alternative of a guilty plea much less plea bargaining. See Albert W. Alschuler, The
Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1983); McCoy & Mirra, supra note
12; see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (approving plea bargaining).
14. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1037, 1107
(1984) ("The Supreme Court has chosen to tolerate, to legitimate, and finally to encourage
the plea bargaining system.").
15. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 20 (2012).
For example, trial by hearsay would be quicker, cheaper, and perhaps more predictable, but
even Justice Scalia does not appear to favor this alternative. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
16. See Gifford, supra note 11, at 70 ("The combination of a determination sentencing
structure and unregulated plea bargaining makes it more likely that a defendant will be
psychologically coerced into an inaccurate or involuntary plea."); Standen, supra note 11;
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2548, 2560 (2004) ("[P]lea bargains outside the law's shadow depend on prosecutors'
ability to make credible threats of severe post-trial sentences. Sentencing guidelines make
it easy to issue those threats."). But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Com-
promise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1977 (1992) ("[Tlhe federal sentencing guidelines serve a
valuable function by establishing benchmark sentences, derived from normal judicial prac-
tices in the years before 1987. A 'price' so established, known to any defendant who elects
trial, squelches one of the perennial attacks on plea bargaining: that the bargain sentence
is the norm, and the higher sentence imposed after trial a penalty heaped on persons who
dare to exercise their constitutional rights."); Scott W. Howe, The Value ofPlea Bargaining,
58 OKLA. L. REv. 599, 623 (2005) ("Arguments that post-trial sentences reflect trial penal-
ties have not confronted the overriding point that post-trial sentences mete out appropriate
retribution. Critics note that bargained discounts are often not themselves based on de-
serts, and, as a result, there is inequality, according to a desert measure, in the distribution
of punishment. While accurate, this conclusion does not subvert the view that post-trial
sentences mete out deserved punishments for crime. A deserved punishment does not
become undeserved merely because other defendants deserving the same punishment re-
ceive a lesser sanction.").
17. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 287 (1983).
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filing or threatening to file charges that carry a high risk or cer-
tainty of harsh punishment if the defendant is convicted and then
offering substantial leniency in exchange for a guilty plea."8 These
decisions invite Congress and state legislatures to authorize unde-
servedly high sentences, including mandatory sentences that re-
move discretion from the sentencing judge, with the expectation
that lower sentences will be imposed on the overwhelming majori-
ty of defendants, who will plead guilty in the plea bargaining pro-
cess. Legislatures understand that prosecutors will charge de-
fendants severely to gain leverage and offer them leniency to se-
cure guilty pleas. In this process, the measure of fair punishment
has ceased to be the excessive sentences that criminal statutes
authorize and trial judges impose on defendants convicted at trial;
rather, the baseline has become the lower (but often still harsh)
sentences that defendants receive after pleading guilty. Defend-
ants pay a stiff penalty for exercising their trial rights. And a plea
bargain often is still no bargain.
For some, guilty pleas may also be a means of escape from pre-
trial detention." Defendants accused of low-level offenses who are
incarcerated pending criminal proceedings may be allowed to
plead guilty in exchange for a non-custodial sentence or time
served. It may appear reasonable to defendants in this situation
to accept the consequences of a conviction in order to secure their
liberty.2 0 Although the Eighth Amendment forbids "[e]xcessive
bail,"2 1 the Court's decisions do not effectively restrict pretrial de-
tention of individuals accused of misdemeanors and low-level felo-
18. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
19. See Bibas, supra note 11, at 2493 (2004) (noting that "pretrial detention places a
high premium on quick plea bargains in small cases, even if the defendant would probably
win acquittal at an eventual trial"); Jenny M. Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 308 (2011)
("Perhaps the most coercive aspect of plea-bargaining in the lower criminal courts is pretri-
al detention for individuals held on bail that they cannot pay. In such cases, defendants
must generally choose between remaining in jail to fight the case or taking an early plea
with a sentence of time served or probation."); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,
71 (1977) ("[T]he guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important compo-
nents of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can benefit all
concerned. The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration. . . .").
20. There is a growing scholarly literature on the collateral consequences of criminal
convictions. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Conse-
quences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253 (2002); Michael Pinard,
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Con-
sequences of Criminal Convictions, Silence and Misinformation in the Guilty Plea Process,
95 IOWA L. REv. 119 (2009).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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nies.2 2 Finally, while it is true that defendants who are at liberty
while awaiting trial on minor charges often plead guilty to avoid
the disruption of returning repeatedly to court-for these defend-
ants, "the process is the punishment"23-there is little to suggest
that protracted criminal proceedings for violations and misde-
meanors are attributable to liberal judicial interpretations of pro-
cedural rights.24
While it seems fair to characterize the criminal process as "a
system of pleas,"2 5 one might observe more broadly that ours is a
system of waivers. A guilty plea, by its nature, waives trial rights,
including the right to a jury trial, to cross-examine witnesses and
to compel their testimony. To the extent of admitting guilt, the
defendant who pleads guilty also waives the right against self-
incrimination. The same leverage that prosecutors employ to ex-
tract guilty pleas is used to extract waivers of rights other than
the trial rights that a guilty plea necessarily waives. The waiver
paradigm-in which prosecutors extract procedural concessions in
exchange for leniency-has come to dominate the criminal justice
landscape.26 The following examples should suffice to make the
point.27
22. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
23. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (2d ed. 1992).
24. Likewise, insofar as criminal defendants plead guilty to escape uncertain outcomes
of a trial, there is no reason to assume that the problem is created by over-developed proce-
dural rights rather than by under-developed rights leading to the risk of erroneous convic-
tions. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) ("Some
counter-factual pleas simply hedge the risk of trial error - i.e., the possibility of conviction
despite the defendant's innocence.").
25. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
26. See Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court, 21 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 757 (1988); Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's
Guide to Loss, Abandonment, and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011 (2000); George E.
Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193
(1977); Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 801, 831-33 (2003);
McMunigal, supra note 12; Stephen A. Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and the Loss of Constitu-
tional Rights: The Current Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (1978); Nirej
Sekhon, Willing Suspects and Docile Defendants: The Contradictory Role of Consent in
Criminal Procedure, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2011); William J. Stuntz, Waiving
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 762 (1989); Michael E. Tigar, Foreword:
Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1970).
27. In addition to the examples that follow in the text below, two other examples of the
dominance of waivers in the criminal process are the following. First, as a condition of
leniency provided to one defendant or potential defendant, prosecutors sometimes require
one or more other defendants to waive their trial rights and plead guilty. This agreement,
in which, for example, a wife may be given leniency if her husband pleads guilty, is some-
times known as a "package" or "wired" plea agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Robin-
Summer 2013 741
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First, prosecutors often require defendants to waive criminal
procedure rights other than trial rights in exchange for a lenient
plea deal. For example, some prosecutors require defendants to
waive the right to appeal and to seek other post-conviction relief,28
including the right to redress sentencing errors that have not yet
occurred. 29  The prosecutor's asserted objective is to conserve ad-
ministrative and judicial resources and achieve finality by assur-
ing that no more proceedings ensue. This means, however, that
even past, unidentified errors and future, unanticipated ones can-
not be corrected-for example, legal and factual errors that will
later occur in sentencing. One might argue that these waivers
reflect an abuse of prosecutorial power, given the public interest in
ensuring that criminal proceedings are fair and that significant
procedural errors are corrected. Prosecutors routinely seek to
vindicate this fair-process interest when they appeal to correct
son, 587 F.3d 1122, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Vest, 125 F.3d 676, 679 (8th
Cir. 1997); see generally Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy,
48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 143, 156-57 (2011); Bruce A. Green, "Package" Plea Bargaining and
the Prosecutor's Duty of Good Faith, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 507 (1989); Dan Markel et al., Crim-
inal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1166 (2007). Se-
cond, as a condition of dismissing charges for crimes of which the defendant may be guilty,
the prosecution sometimes allows the defendant to plead guilty to a less serious charge of
which the prosecutor (and judge) know the defendant is innocent - in effect, requiring the
defendant to waive the right not to be convicted of a crime he or she did not commit. See
generally Mari Byrne, Note, Baseless Pleas: A Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961
(2010).
28. Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 127 (1995).
The right to challenge a denial of competent representation is among the post-conviction
rights that prosecutors have required defendants to bargain away in exchange for leniency.
In general, the bar's position is that, under the ethics codes, this is a right that a defendant
cannot be asked to waive. See Fla. Proposed Adv. Op. 12-1 (June 22, 2012) (citing, inter
alia, Az. Ethics Op. 95-08; Mo. Formal Ethics Op. 126 (2009); N.C. Ethics Op. 129 (1993);
Oh. Ethics Op. 2001-6; Tenn. Informal Op. 94-A-549; Vt. Ethics Op. 95-04); see also R. Mi-
chael Cassidy, Some Reflections on Ethics and Plea Bargaining: An Essay in Honor of Fred
Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 108 (2011) ("Insisting on so-called ineffective counsel
waivers impresses me as overreaching of the worst sort and fundamentally inconsistent
with a prosecutor's obligation as a minister of justice."). But see Texas Ethics Op. 571
(2006). But courts have held that a waiver of this right of post-conviction review is effective
as long as the guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, see, e.g., Cooper v. State, 356 S.W.3d
149 (Mo. 2011), and disciplinary authorities have not sanctioned prosecutors who include
such waivers in their plea agreements or defense lawyers who advise their clients to accept
these agreements. See, e.g., id. at 156-57. Consequently, if a prosecutor were worried that
a defendant who accepted a plea offer might later complain that defense counsel was inad-
equate in failing to obtain a better one, the prosecutor could require the defendant to waive
the right to make this claim. Insofar as courts accepted and enforced these waivers, they
afford prosecutors a procedure by which to circumvent the decisions in Cooper and Frye.
See Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains that Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance-Waiving
Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 647 (2013).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Morales Lopez, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9607 (4th Cir. May
10, 2012); United States v. Benitez-Zapata, 131 F.3d 1444, 1446-47 (11th Cir. 1997).
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purportedly illegal sentences that they believe to be too low. If the
public interest in correcting procedural errors outweighs the coun-
tervailing public interests when sentences are too low, then one
would think that the same interest in correcting errors would be
paramount when sentences are too high, particularly given the
liberty interest that is also implicated.
Prosecutors also extract waivers of rights designed not simply to
promote procedural fairness but to rectify convictions of the inno-
cent. In particular, prosecutors have sometimes required defend-
ants to waive the right to DNA testing to attempt to establish
their innocence."0 The Supreme Court has allowed the prosecution
also to use its leverage to extract waivers of civil rights. For ex-
ample, the Court has held that it is constitutional to condition the
dismissal of criminal charges on the defendant's waiver of the
right to bring a civil rights claim to redress abuses by law en-
forcement officers.3 1 Prosecutors have also conditioned leniency on
non-citizens' consent to deportation, 32 on professionals' relin-
quishment of licenses, or on the relinquishment of other rights
unrelated to the criminal proceedings.
It is interesting to contemplate whether there are any rights
that the Supreme Court would not permit criminal defendants to
waive, or that prosecutors as a matter of ethics or self-restraint
would never compel defendants to waive, in exchange for leniency.
The Court has left open the question of whether prosecutors can
negotiate for defendants to waive the due process right to receive
pre-trial disclosures of exculpatory evidence.3 ' Although the
American Bar Association has concluded that prosecutors have a
non-negotiable ethical duty to disclose favorable evidence to the
defense, 35 prosecutors do not necessarily accept the bar associa-
tion's assessment. Perhaps the most fundamental procedural
right, and one not waived by a guilty plea, is the right to counsel.
30. Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REv. 952 (2012).
31. Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987). In some jurisdictions, however, release-
dismissal agreements violate state law or are regarded as unethical. See, e.g., Cowles v.
Brownell, 538 N.E.2d 325 (N.Y. 1989); Indiana Op. 2005-2 (2005). See generally Andrew B.
Coan, The Legal Ethics of Release-Dismissal Agreements: Theory and Practice, 1 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 371 (2005).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Cardosa-Rodriguez, 241 F.3d 613, 614 (8th Cir. 2001).
33. See, e.g., Grayboyes v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233, *4
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1995).
34. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
35. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454
(2009). For a discussion of this opinion, see Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors' Ethical Duty of
Disclosure In Memory of Fred Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 57 (2011).
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Suppose the prosecutor, to conserve state resources, required the
defendant to forgo appointed counsel and proceed pro se, on the
theory that if a defendant can waive the right to counsel," the de-
fendant can accept an inducement to do so. One would hope that
the Court would regard such a waiver as involuntary or otherwise
unacceptable, and that prosecutors would consider it an abuse of
power to secure waivers of counsel in any event, but the extant
opinions and practices do not guarantee such outcomes.
Second, waivers of rights may be extracted not only in exchange
for actual leniency but in exchange merely for the opportunity to
be considered for lenient treatment that may never materialize.3 7
For example, although the evidence rules protect against the ad-
mission of statements made in plea negotiations, the Supreme
Court has held that this protection may be waived." Some prose-
cutors exploit this opportunity by requiring defendants who wish
to be considered for a favorable plea offer to submit to questioning
and to agree that, at least in certain circumstances, the prosecu-
tion may offer the defendants' statements in evidence if no plea
bargain is concluded." One might question whether this practice
accords with prosecutors' duty to ascertain all the relevant facts in
order to exercise charging discretion fairly. The traditional proffer
agreement (sometimes known as a "queen for a day agreement")
protected the prosecution from being disadvantaged by the de-
fendant's proffer. It authorized the prosecution to use the defend-
ant's statements for investigative leads, thereby foreclosing future
suppression motions. But the agreement did not allow prosecutors
to offer the defendant's statements in evidence, as contemporary
agreements sometimes do. It is hard to justify prosecutors' unwill-
36. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
37. United States v. Duffy, 133 F. Supp. 2d 213, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ("After signing the
standard proffer agreement, the terms of which are dictated by the government, the only
thing that a defendant is guaranteed is the chance to convince the prosecutor to enter a
deal."), overruled in part by United States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2004); see
Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa Main, "Waiving" Goodbye: Plea Bargaining and the
Defense Dilemma of Competent Representation, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1029 (2011).
38. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995). See generally Montre D.
Carodine, Keeping It Real: Reforming the "Untried Conviction" Impeachment Rule, 69 MD.
L. REV. 501 (2010); Michael S. Gershowitz, Waiver of the Plea-Statement Rules, 86 J. CRTM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1439 (1996); Benjamin Naftalis, "Queen for a Day" Agreements and the
Proper Scope of Permissible Waiver of the Federal Plea-Statement Rules, 37 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 1 (2003); Eric Rasmusen, Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self-Incrimination,
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1541 (1998).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 568-69 (3d Cir. 2008); United
States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402,
407 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1321-22 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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ingness to listen to a defendant's account, which might justify le-
nient treatment, unless the prosecutor is given this procedural
advantage. Prosecutors should not ignore information relevant to
their charging and plea-bargaining decisions.40 But they effective-
ly do so when they refuse to listen to a defendant who does not
waive the protection of the evidentiary rule.
A controversial example of the pressure to waive procedural
rights simply in exchange for the possibility of escaping harsh out-
comes occurs in the context of corporate criminal investigations
and prosecutions. A so-called "culture of waiver"41 of the corporate
attorney-client privilege has arisen in response to federal policy
governing corporate prosecutions. Corporations are easy to prose-
cute under statutes providing for vicarious corporate criminal lia-
bility for criminal wrongdoing by corporate representatives. 42
Under federal policy, companies can typically avoid prosecution if
they cooperate with criminal investigators. Knowing this, compa-
nies whose representatives are suspected of wrongdoing routinely
hire lawyers to conduct expensive internal investigations and pro-
vide the results to the prosecution in exchange for leniency.4 3 Ex-
ploiting the leverage afforded by corporate criminal statutes, pros-
ecutors have transformed the investigation and prosecution of
corporate crime in a manner that, from the prosecution's perspec-
tive, is undoubtedly cheaper, quicker, more effective, and unre-
strained by procedural restrictions on investigative methods.
Finally, waivers of rights may be extracted in exchange for ben-
efits other than lenient charging and sentencing.44 For example,
low-level defendants may be required to waive their rights as a
condition of diversion to problem-solving and specialized courts.
Mental health courts, drug courts, veterans courts and other spe-
cialized courts are praiseworthy in many respects, including in
their recognition of low-level offenses as symptomatic of broader
40. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FoRDHAML. REV. 2117 (1997).
41. See, e.g., Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle And Their Employees Cry Foul:
Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure On Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 92
(2007).
42. See generally Bruce A. Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Internal Investiga-
tions: Achieving Fairness for Corporate Constituents, 54 B.C. L. REv. 73 (2013).
43. See id. at 75.
44. For example, prosecutors have sometimes required waivers as a condition of an
arrested defendant's pre-trial release. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863 (9th
Cir. 2005) (waiver of Fourth Amendment right held unenforceable). See generally Melanie
D. Wilson, The Price of Pretrial Release: Can We Afford to Keep Our Fourth Amendment
Rights?, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 159 (2006).
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individual problems, such as addiction or mental illness, and in
offering alternatives to incarceration, including treatment. But, in
some jurisdictions, defendants who seek to have their cases di-
verted to these alternative courts are required to relinquish proce-
dural rights in exchange, and some defendants ultimately end up
worse off for having done so. For example, defendants in some
drug courts are required to plead guilty and face harsher punish-
ment if they are unsuccessful in their drug treatment program
than if they had simply gone to criminal court and participated in
the traditional plea bargaining process.45 As a condition of obtain-
ing treatment in lieu of incarceration, defendants in some prob-
lem-solving courts also tacitly forgo the right to counsel, who will
function as a zealous advocate, because defense counsel is ex-
pected to join the therapeutic team.46
It is fatuous to suggest that defendants waiving rights in the
contemporary criminal process are seeking relief from a rights-
driven trial process rather than from harsh outcomes. One might
even question whether prosecutors are sacrificing anything mean-
ingful in this system of waivers in order to obtain relief from the
length, expense and unpredictability of the trial process occa-
sioned by overly protective judicial decisions. Criminal defendants
are sacrificing procedural protections, but prosecutors give up lit-
tle. Rather, prosecutors use their leverage, in a manner legiti-
mized by judicial decisions, to achieve results they generally re-
gard as just. Although the system promotes prosecutors' adminis-
trative interests, they are impelled to give up little in exchange.
45. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 792-94
(2008).
46. See, e.g., Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defend-
er About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37, 46-47
(2001). In Wisconsin, the problem-solving model contemplates that the defendant will forgo
counsel altogether, and that the lawyer on the therapeutic team assigned to represent the
defense perspective owes no duties to the defendant whatsoever. See Ben Kempinen, Prob-
lem-Solving Courts and the Defense Function: The Wisconsin Experience, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
1349, 1362-63 (2011).
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II. EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION IN THE PLEA/WAIVER PROCESS:
A LARGELY SYMBOLIC RIGHT
Today's opinions deal with only two aspects of counsel's plea-
bargaining inadequacy and leave other aspects (who knows
what they might be?) to be worked out in further constitutional
litigation that will burden the criminal process."
One might suppose that decisions upholding criminal defend-
ants' constitutional rights and providing remedies for violating
those rights necessarily impose burdens on the criminal process,
so that it would be axiomatic that, as Justice Scalia complains, a
robust criminal procedure jurisprudence will "burden the criminal
process." But that is not necessarily so, and it is particularly un-
true of the ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence that
Justice Scalia targets. The principal contribution of the two re-
cent decisions in particular is largely symbolic.
Fundamentally, Cooper and Frye address the constitutional ob-
ligations of criminal defense lawyers, not judges, prosecutors or
investigators. What is expected of a criminal defense lawyer for
constitutional purposes, however, is determined by prevailing pro-
fessional norms. Under the leading case, Strickland v. Washing-
ton,4 8 a defendant must show two things to establish a denial of
the right to competent representation, the first being that the de-
fense lawyer's performance "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness."4 9 Courts determine what conduct is reasonable
based on ordinary practices in the professional community,o
which may be codified by standards for criminal defense practice
such as those of the American Bar Association." Therefore, by
47. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In the intervening decades, the Supreme Court has decided
many cases applying and interpreting Strickland. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.
1473 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
49. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
50. Id.
51. Id. ("Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association stand-
ards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable."); see, e.g., Padilla, 130
S. Ct. at 1488 ("The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel
must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation."); see also Welsh S. White, Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L.
REV. 323, 377-78 ("[I]ncorporating into Strickland the principles articulated in the ABA
Guidelines (and reflected in the practice of seasoned capital defense attorneys) is a neces-
sary step towards providing effective representation in capital cases."). But see Bobby v.
Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 20 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (questioning special relevance of
ABA Standards). For a discussion of the role of the Standards in the development of case
law under Strickland, see Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Stand-
Summer 2013 747
Duquesne Law Review
definition, ineffective assistance of counsel decisions add nothing
to defense lawyers' preexisting professional obligations.
Justice Scalia's dissent suggests the possibility, however, that
Cooper and Frye will burden both courts administratively and the
criminal process generally by inviting new claims that will require
resources to resolve, and in some cases opening the door to need-
less trials of guilty defendants. But this seems doubtful.
Although decisions finding ineffective assistance of counsel do
leave open the possibility of a constitutional remedy for serious
departures from the professional norms, the Strickland require-
ments raise substantial hurdles. Besides showing that defense
counsel significantly erred, the defendant must show that he was
prejudiced by defense counsel's errors-that is, that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional er-
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."5 2
Many convicted defendants complain about their lawyers, but
most find one or both requirements to be insurmountable.5 3 Death
row defendants historically have a fighting chance of overturning
their sentences or convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel,
whether because death penalty defenders are particularly unqual-
ified, death penalty cases are particularly complicated and expen-
sive to defend competently, courts are particularly solicitous of
defendants' rights in capital cases, or some combination of the
three.54 The success rate for other defendants in establishing inef-
fective assistance of counsel is exceedingly low. There is an abun-
dance of academic writing on the Sixth Amendment right, to
ards: Forty Years of Excellence, 23 CRIM. JUST.at 4, 10 (2009). The Standards are periodi-
cally subject to a process of review and revision, including, at present, by representatives of
the defense bar, prosecution and judiciary. See Bruce A. Green, Developing Standards of
Conduct for Prosecutors and Criminal Defense Lawyers, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1093 (2011); Rory
K. Little, The ABA's Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution
and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111 (2011).
52. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
53. Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 683-84 (2007) ("Many scholars and
judges recognize that the number of criminal convictions that courts reverse due to ineffec-
tive assistance of trial counsel is strikingly low when compared to the frequency of ineffec-
tive assistance in practice."). For a discussion of the obstacles to proving that a defendant
pleaded guilty based on erroneous advice, see Bruce A. Green, Judicial Rationalizations for
Rationing Justice: How Sixth Amendment Doctrine Undermines Reform, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1729 (2002) [hereinafter Judicial Rationalizations].
54. On the right to effective representation in capital cases, see, e.g., Bruce A. Green,
Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433
(1993) [hereinafter Lethal Fiction]; Helen Gredd, Comment, Washington v. Stricklan&
Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1544
(1983).
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which I have contributed," and the dominant theme is that the
Strickland test is too demanding." Some judges have agreed.
Among the reasons are that courts strongly presume that a law-
yer's questionable conduct is reasonable and tend to assume that,
unless the evidence against the defendant was extremely weak,
the attorney's errors made no difference either to the jury's verdict
or the defendant's decision to plead guilty.
In the plea bargaining process, the professional norms govern-
ing defense lawyers are fairly well-established," and although
lapses may occur regularly, it is by no means clear how often laps-
es occur that would realistically justify a Strickland claim. The
lawyer's principal task is to assist the defendant in deciding
whether to plead guilty or stand trial." The lawyer is expected to
solicit as favorable a plea offer as possible, which may require at-
tempting to establish a credible defense or making mitigating ar-
guments to the prosecutor.o The lawyer must convey any plea
offer to the client61 and then advise the client whether to accept it,
55. See Bruce A. Green, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1053 (1980) [hereinafter A Functional Analysis]; Bruce A. Green, Criminal
Neglect: Indigent Defense from an Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Criminal Neglect]; Judicial Rationalizations, supra note 53; Lethal Fiction, supra note
54.
56. See, e.g., Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads,
New Paths - A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1986); Adele Bernhard, Take Courage:
What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery of Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. PITT. L.
REV. 293 (2002); Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review
of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1 (2004); Sanjay K Chhablani, Dis-
entangling the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2009); Don-
ald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242 (1997); Monroe H. Freedman, Lecture, An Ethical Mani-
festo for Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 911 (2005); William S. Geimer, A Decade of
Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995); Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and
Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59
(1986); Primus, supra note 53; William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Crimi-
nal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 20 (1997); Russell L. Weaver, The
Perils of Being Poor: Indigent Defense and Effective Assistance, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 435
(2003).
57. See, e.g., McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (referring to "[t]he impotence of the Strickland standard").
58. See, e.g., Criminal Neglect, supra note 55.
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 1.4 (2012) [hereinafter MODEL RULES];
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5.1, 4-6.1, 4-6.2 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS, Defense Function Standards]; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-3.2
(3d ed. 1997).
60. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 40; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note
59.
61. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, Defense Function Standards, supra note 59, 4-6.2(b) (A
defense lawyer should "promptly communicate and explain to the accused all significant
Summer 2013 749
Duquesne Law Review
which means giving accurate advice about the likely consequences
if the defendant either accepts the plea offer or goes to trial.62 To
give accurate advice, the lawyer will ordinarily have to interview
the client, review discovery and conduct an investigation as neces-
sary to learn the relevant facts, and to conduct legal research as
necessary to learn the relevant law.63
Cooper and Frye, decided in Spring 2012, may have been
among the rare cases in which defense counsel demonstrably
failed to meet professional expectations and the defendant re-
ceived a significantly harsher outcome as a consequence, and one
that was harsh enough to justify post-conviction proceedings. This
engendered the question of whether the defendants had a consti-
tutional remedy and, if so, what it would be. In other words, how,
if at all, does the Sixth Amendment right apply when lawyers al-
legedly provide inadequate representation in the plea bargaining
process?
The debate over whether the constitutional right to counsel has
implications for a defense lawyer's role in plea bargaining origi-
nated as early as the 1970s, well before Strickland confirmed that
the right to competent representation derives from the Sixth
Amendment. Courts recognized the defense lawyer's obligation to
advise the defendant about whether to plead guilty."
But although some courts were of the view that the lawyer's con-
plea proposals made by the prosecutor."); see also MODEL RULES, supra note 59, R. 1.2(a)
("[Tihe lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to
the plea to be entered."); id. at R. 1.4(a)(1) (A lawyer must "promptly inform the client of
any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent . . . is
required by these Rules.").
62. ABA STANDARDS, Defense Function Standards, supra note 59, 4-5.1(a); MODEL
RULES, supra note 59, R. 1.4(b) (A lawyer must "explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions.").
63. MODEL RULES, supra note 59, R. 1.1; ABA STANDARDS, Defense Function Standards,
supra note 59, 4-5.1(a).
64. For academic writing, predating these decisions, on the right to competent repre-
sentation in plea bargaining, see, e.g., David A. Perez, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffec-
tive Assistance of Counsel During Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J. 1532 (2011); Jenny Rob-
erts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 How. L.J. 693 (2011); Emily Rubin, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel and Guilty Pleas: Toward a Paradigm of Informed Consent, 80 VA. L.
REV. 1699 (1994).
65. See, e.g., Caruso v. Zelinsky, 515 F. Supp. 676, 680 (D.N.J. 1981) ("The obligation of
counsel to permit the client to make final determinations concerning a plea, and conse-
quently to inform the client fully on the available alternatives, is set forth in the various
codes of conduct with which all attorneys are expected to comply."); United States ex rel.
Simon v. Murphy, 349 F.Supp. 818, 823-24 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Courts continued to so recognize
after Strickland. See, e.g., People v. Perry, 68 P.3d 472, 477 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Davie v.
State, 675 S.E.2d 416, 420 (S.C. 2009); State v. James, 739 P.2d 1161,1166-67 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987).
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stitutional obligation was to assist the defendant in making "a
well-advised choice,"" others "suggested that the function of coun-
sel as an advisor is limited, at least for constitutional purposes, to
ensuring that a client's waiver of [trial rights] is a knowing and
voluntary act" as required by the Due Process Clause."
Even before the Court decided Strickland, Supreme Court juris-
prudence favored the broader view of defense counsel's constitu-
tional role. The Court had recognized that "[a] counseled defend-
ant's decision to plead guilty.. . . must rest upon his attorney's
judgment regarding the weight of the state's case; how the facts,
as he understands them, would be viewed by a jury; the likelihood
that those facts would establish guilt; and the admissibility of
seized evidence or incriminating statements that contribute to the
state's showing of culpability." This meant that the defense law-
yer's constitutional function was not just to assure the defendant a
fair process by explaining the trial rights-a function duplicating
that of the trial judge. The lawyer was also required to protect
against guilty pleas that were "poorly considered" where, for ex-
ample, the defendant was unaware that he would likely be acquit-
ted at trial or that a guilty plea would relinquish important collat-
eral rights." Strickland might have been read to resolve the ques-
tion in favor of the broader constitutional role insofar as it held
that the reasonableness of a defense lawyer's performance is es-
tablished by prevailing professional norms, which demanded con-
siderably more than safeguarding constitutional rights. Subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions bolstered that perception.70 Lower
courts got the message," although some outliers clung to the view
66. A Functional Analysis, supra note 55, at 1085 n.203.
67. Id. at 1084.
68. Id. at 1084-85 n.205 (citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1970)).
69. Id. at 1085-86.
70. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (recognizing "that the
negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel."); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57
(1985) (Strickland's "two-part standard seems to us applicable to ineffective-assistance
claims arising out of the plea process.").
71. The majority rule at the time the Court decided Cooper and Frye was that ineffec-
tiveness leading to loss of a favorable plea offer is remediable. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Arave,
455 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006); Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542, 553 (6th Cir. 2001); Unit-
ed States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994); People v. Gandiaga, 70 P.3d 523,
527 (Colo. App., 2002); Jiminez v. State, 144 P.3d 903, 907 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006); State v.
Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Tenn. 2000); Becton v. Hun, 205 W. Va. 139 (W. Va. 1999);
see also State v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1189 n.4 (Utah 2007) (citing examples); Albert W.
Summer 2013 751
Duquesne Law Review
that ineffectiveness in plea bargaining is irremediable because a
defendant is not "prejudiced" by losing a favorable plea opportuni-
ty.7 2 Cooper and Frye presented a chance definitively to resolve
the question that technically remained open.73
A basic understanding of the Cooper and Frye decisions, begin-
ning with their underlying facts, is useful in considering the deci-
sions' legal significance. Cooper's lawyer gave legally incorrect
advice. Cooper fired a gun at the victim's head but missed, and
then fired at her again, wounding her three times. The prosecutor
charged Cooper with several crimes, including assault with intent
to murder, but offered to dismiss half the charges and to recom-
mend a sentence of fifty-one to eighty-five months imprisonment if
Cooper pled guilty. Cooper's lawyer inaccurately advised him that
he could not be found to have had the intent to murder because
the shots struck below the victim's waist. Having been led to ex-
pect an acquittal on the most serious charge, Cooper rejected the
favorable plea offer, was convicted at trial on all the charges, and
received a mandatory minimum sentence of 185 to 360 months
imprisonment. That is to say, he was sentenced to spend around
eleven to thirty-five years longer in prison because he followed his
lawyer's erroneous advice.74
Frye's lawyer failed to convey the prosecutor's written plea offer
as he was ethically obligated to do. Having been charged with
driving with a revoked license, Frye faced up to four years' impris-
onment. The prosecutor wrote to Frye's lawyer offering two possi-
ble plea bargains, one of which would have carried a recommenda-
tion of ninety days' imprisonment, but the lawyer failed to tell
Frye about the offer before it expired. Before this matter was re-
solved, Frye was arrested again for driving with a revoked license.
Having lost the benefit of the plea offer, he pled guilty to the orig-
inal charges and received a three-year prison sentence. There is
no guarantee that, if Frye had known of the original offer and
tried to accept it, the prosecutor would have kept the offer on the
table despite Frye's re-arrest or that the trial judge would have
Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REV.
673, 608 n.32-33 (2013).
72. See, e.g., Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) ("In the terms of Strickland's prejudice prong, the loss of a plea bargain does
not 'undermine confidence' in the outcome of a subsequent fair trial."); United States v.
Springs, 988 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993); State v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185 (Utah 2007).
73. See generally Roberts, supra note 64.
74. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).
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accepted Frye's guilty plea and imposed the recommended sen-
tence. But if so, the defense lawyer's lapse meant the difference
between a three-month sentence and a three-year sentence.
In pursuing relief based on the Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel, neither Cooper nor Frye had much diffi-
culty proving the inadequacy of his respective lawyer's perfor-
mance. At least in Cooper's case, prejudice seemed obvious.
Cooper would have accepted the plea bargain if he had not been
advised incorrectly that, as a matter of law, he was innocent of the
most serious charge. He would have received a much lower sen-
tence by pleading guilty. That sounds like serious prejudice, if
prejudice means an adverse outcome, which is how the Court's
majority saw it." Frye's case was harder, however. Even if Frye
had tried to plead guilty, he might have lost the benefit of the pro-
posed deal because of his subsequent arrest. The Court remanded
for consideration of whether or not Frye was prejudiced in light of
this possibility."
"Not so fast," said the dissenting Justices. They believed Cooper
was not prejudiced by the loss of a lenient plea offer because he
received a fair trial." Frye even more certainly was not preju-
diced, they maintained, because he not only received a fair pro-
cess-that is, a fair guilty plea proceeding-but admitted his own
guilt." In their view, the defense lawyer's role, as far as the Con-
stitution is concerned, is not to try to mitigate the harshness of the
criminal charges, but simply to stand guard to assure that the de-
fendant's procedural rights are protected. They reasoned that the
right to competent representation is intended to assure the de-
fendant a fair process; that the right is therefore not violated "un-
less counsel's mistakes call into question the basic justice of a de-
fendant's conviction or sentence;" and that defense counsel's mis-
takes in the plea bargaining context do not call the fairness of a
conviction into question because "a criminal defendant has no
right to plea bargain." 0
75. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404-05 (2012).
76. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1384.
77. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411.
78. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1412(Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1395 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The constitutional role envi-
sioned by the dissenting Justices may be even narrower than first appears, given the view
expressed at the outset of Justice Scalia's dissent that constitutional rights in state crimi-
nal proceedings are generally too protective. In the dissenters' ideal world, defense counsel
might have little to do, because the constitutional rights to be protected would be minimal.
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Having found a violation of the constitutional right to competent
representation, the Court faced the tricky question of what the
remedy should be when a defendant such as Cooper or Frye proves
that he missed out on a favorable plea bargain because his defense
lawyer performed unreasonably poorly."1 In other contexts, the
remedy for a violation of this right is obvious. If a lawyer's mis-
takes at trial contribute to the jury's guilty verdict, a court vacates
the conviction and gives the defendant a new trial.8 2 Likewise, if a
lawyer's bad advice leads a defendant to plead guilty, a court va-
cates the conviction." The Court addressed that situation two
years earlier in Padilla v. Kentucky,84 in which the immigrant de-
fendant pleaded guilty to drug charges after his lawyer wrongly
assured him that deportation would not follow his conviction.
It is less clear, however, how a court should remedy the situa-
tion when a defendant misses out on a favorable plea offer. Simp-
ly vacating the conviction, while restoring the opportunity to plea
bargain, might be unfair to the defendant, because the prosecution
might not re-extend the original offer. Ordering specific perfor-
mance of the original plea agreement might be unfair to the state,
however, if the trial judge would not originally have accepted a
guilty plea pursuant to the terms of that agreement or if changed
circumstances make the original plea offer inappropriate. The
Court concluded that trial courts have authority to reach an equi-
table resolution depending on the facts of the particular case." It
held that the prosecution should be ordered to reoffer the original
plea agreement, and if the defendant accepts the offer, the court
would then decide whether, as a matter of discretion, to vacate the
81. See, e.g., A Functional Analysis, supra note 55, at 1090-91 ("The problem of select-
ing an appropriate remedy after finding a denial of sixth amendment rights further compli-
cates review of ineffectiveness [in cases involving inadequate advice]. ... The defendant
who is denied effective assistance in plea bargaining and receives a severe sentence after
conviction at trial poses a more acute problem. The only meaningful relief for such a de-
fendant would be the unusual step of reversing his conviction, thus returning the accused
the bargaining leverage he lost through his counsel's ineffectiveness.") (citing Cole v. Slay-
ton, 378 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Va. 1974)); Perez, supra note 64.
82. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (setting forth required
components of a "convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as
to require reversal of a conviction"); see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
Likewise, if the lawyer's errors affected the sentencing proceeding, the remedy is re-
sentencing. See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S.
374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
83. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52
(1985).
84. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
85. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1389.
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conviction and resentence the defendant under the agreement."
In Cooper, Justice Scalia's dissent criticized the remedy for its "in-
coherence,"8 Justice Alito's separate dissent criticized the remedy
for being "opaque,"" and both suggested that the deficiency of the
remedy demonstrates that incompetence in connection with plea
bargaining does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to compe-
tent representation in the first place."
The inevitable question is, what is the legal significance of the
Court's opinions in Cooper and Frye?"o One way to approach the
question is to ask whether the decisions will burden courts with
more meritorious ineffective assistance of counsel claims; another
is to ask whether the decisions will open the door to the expansion
of constitutional rights or restrictions relating to other aspects of
plea bargaining, such as restrictions on prosecutors' ability to
bring extremely harsh charges to employ bargaining chips. These
approaches were Justice Scalia's preoccupations. He predicted
that the Court's decisions would burden courts by inviting addi-
tional constitutional challenges to the conduct of plea bargaining,
leading to a new constitutional jurisprudence on the duties of de-
fense lawyers and prosecutors alike."
Justice Scalia has previously exaggerated the administrative
burden that upholding constitutional rights imposes on the judici-
ary,92 and his dissent in Cooper was no exception." Cases in which
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1398 (Alito, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1394-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I suspect that the Court's squeamishness in
fashioning a remedy, and the incoherence of what it comes up with, is attributable to its
realization, deep down, that there is no real constitutional violation here anyway."); id. at
1398 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The weakness in the Court's analysis is highlighted by its
opaque discussion of the remedy that is appropriate when a plea offer is rejected due to
defective legal representation.").
90. See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Padilla v. Kentucky: Sound and Fury, or Transformative
Impact, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 203 (2011).
91. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) ("And it
would be foolish to think that 'constitutional' rules governing counsel's behavior will not be
followed by rules governing the prosecution's behavior in the plea-bargaining process").
92. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 60
SYRACUSE L. REV. 229, 236 (2010) (maintaining that Justice Scalia exaggerated the likeli-
hood that elected state-court judges would be burdened with judicial recusal motions for
accepting campaign contributions from lawyers and parties).
93. See Alschuler, supra note 71, at 681 ("Lafler and Frye gave defendants nothing they
did not already have."); Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial
Reforms, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 150, 159 (2012) ("In the short term, Lafler and Frye will matter
less to the court system than one might expect. . . . [I]n practice their holdings are unlikely
to upset many convictions or disrupt other aspects of judges' day-to-day work, pace Justice
Scalia. ... [MIost circuits had already been applying the basic approach that the Court
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defendants convincingly assert that they missed out on favorable
plea bargains because of defense counsel's mistakes have not come
before courts very often, and there is no reason to think that will
change. To be sure, maladroit representation in plea bargaining
may be prevalent,9 4 and more skillful plea bargaining will make a
difference to the outcome." But it does not follow that many de-
fendants will have an ability to make the requisite showing to
gain relief under Strickland, or even have a realistic incentive to
try.
Other than in rare cases such as Cooper and Frye where egre-
gious and potentially fatal errors demonstrably were made, most
such claims will be dismissed quickly based on the reasonableness
of counsel's performance, lack of prejudice to the defendant, or
both. For example, questionable strategy in plea negotiations will
not be remediable because Strickland's reasonableness standard
for assessing the defense lawyer's performance is highly deferen-
adopted in Lafler and Frye with few problems, few defendants will muster the necessary
proof to demonstrate ineffective plea-bargaining assistance, judges are naturally disin-
clined to overturn convictions, and judges are unlikely to dispense overly generous reme-
dies."); Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39 (2012),
available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/06/2llynch.html ("The only surprise about the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper is that there were
four dissents. The decisions are straightforward recognitions that the defendants in those
cases received unquestionably derelict representation, to their considerable prejudice.");
Richard E. Myers II, Rereading Cronic and Strickland in Light of Padilla, Frye, and Lafler,
45 TEx. TECH L. REV. 229, 246 (2012) ("The ultimate impact of the new line of effective
assistance of counsel cases remains to be seen, but it is unlikely that they were intended to
open the floodgates for successful challenges."); cf Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Indirect
Potential of Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 633, 633[ (2013) (acknowledging that "[tlhe
direct impact of these opinions is not likely to be dramatic," but maintaining that the deci-
sions " hold the potential to improve the quality of representation defendants receive in the
negotiation process and may lead judges to create a set of advisory guidelines for the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion."). But see Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1161 (2012) (maintaining that the
decisions may lead to a more liberal reading of the right to effective assistance of counsel in
other contexts).
94. See, e.g., Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting
the Innocent: the Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB.
L. 189, 219 (2002) ("The very nature of the plea bargain system invites inadequate repre-
sentation and underscores the need for refining the system. Defense attorneys often have
little time to devote to their cases and often can manage only quick and cursory interac-
tions with their clients and prosecutors. . . . [I]ndividual cases fail to receive the attention
they deserve as the bargaining process becomes more and more habitual for defense attor-
neys and prosecutors.").
95. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal
Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41 (1985); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as
Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 78-81 (1995); Steven
Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Centered Counseling, 39
B.C. L. REV. 841 (1998).
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tial. 9 Likewise, it will be nearly impossible to prove prejudice
other than where the prosecutor put an explicit plea offer on the
table, because the mere possibility that more effective advocacy
would have led to a favorable offer, and that the defendant would
have accepted the offer, will typically be dismissed as speculative.
The proof that Cooper and Frye do not open the floodgates to win-
ning ineffective assistance of counsel claims is that, in jurisdic-
tions where courts anticipated the Cooper and Frye decisions by
recognizing the possibility of a remedy when a defendant misses
out on a favorable plea offer because of defense counsel's error,"
few convictions have been reversed on this basis."
One might also be skeptical of whether Cooper and Frye will
open the door to the development of a new, expansive and burden-
some constitutional jurisprudence regulating plea bargaining in
general. Some envision a new and salutary jurisprudence to ad-
dress some of the perceived unfairness of the process." But there
is reason for skepticism: courts in jurisdictions that anticipated
Cooper and Frye did not couple the right to effective assistance
with a more protective jurisprudence of plea bargaining generally.
In any event, a constitutional jurisprudence on defense and prose-
cution plea bargaining duties will not blossom without the Court's
acquiescence. If the day ever comes that the law begins to develop
too far too fast-if lower courts begin recognizing new federal con-
stitutional rights and restrictions relating to plea bargaining, such
as a prosecutorial duty to refrain from overcharging-the Court
can halt its development. 00
That Cooper and Frye carry a modest cost to the criminal pro-
cess does not mean that they are insignificant. Decisions on the
right to competent counsel have a signaling or symbolic signifi-
cance; they may influence criminal defense lawyers indirectly by
96. See, e.g., Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011).
97. Prior to the Supreme Court decisions, lower federal courts of different circuits and
various state courts had recognized the availability of relief under Strickland when ineffec-
tive representation leads to loss of a favorable plea agreement. See supra note 71.
98. Notably, although more than half the state Attorneys General joined an amicus
brief opposing the defendant's claim in Cooper, they made no argument that applying
Strickland to defense errors in plea bargaining would lead to judicial or administrative
burden or had done so to date. Brief for Connecticut and Twenty-six Other States as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Lafier v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
99. See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, supra note 93, at 1216 ("The practical consequences of
a broad construction of Strickland in the pretrial context may prove to be one of the most
significant criminal procedure developments in decades.").
100. Indeed, the Court has an opportunity to restrict the reach of Cooper and Frye. See
Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3470 (Feb. 25, 2013).
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encouraging or discouraging particular professional conduct by
defense lawyers.'o The jurisprudence is a mixed blessing. On one
hand, it implicitly encourages defense lawyers to aim low by deny-
ing a constitutional remedy based on lack of prejudice in many
cases where the defense lawyer's conduct was ethically and pro-
fessionally improper, such as where lawyers conducted inadequate
investigations.'0 2 The problem is compounded by the lack of seri-
ous disciplinary enforcement and the absence of a meaningful civil
remedy when criminal defense lawyers perform incompetently.0 o
On the other hand, inadequate remedy aside, the decisions ex-
press the importance of competence in various aspects of criminal
defense representation, some of which might otherwise be invisi-
ble. That is especially true of decisions addressing defense law-
yers' advice regarding guilty pleas. Simply by addressing and
leaving open some slim possibility of a remedy for incompetent
representation in the plea bargaining process, the decisions in
Cooper and Frye signal to the defense bar that the quality of their
professional conduct matters.
The two decisions also have a practical significance in that they
discourage states from circumscribing defense lawyers' roles. Im-
agine that the dissenting Justices had carried the day. At least
initially, defense lawyers would remain professionally obligated to
provide competent representation in the plea bargaining process
consistent with the professional norms. Although the lawyers'
lapses would not be remediable, the lawyers would at least in the-
ory remain subject to discipline for egregious professional miscon-
duct. But suppose a state decided to limit funding for indigent
defense by refusing to pay for work that went beyond the lawyer's
constricted constitutional function, as defined by the dissenters. A
state might say, for example,
Lawyers will no longer be compensated for hours spent inves-
tigating and researching the possible defenses before advising
the defendant whether to accept a plea offer. Once a prosecu-
tor puts a plea offer on the table, and unless the offer is re-
jected, the lawyer will be compensated only for time spent
telling the defendant what he needs to know to make any
guilty plea constitutional-for example, that he has a right to
101. Criminal Neglect, supra note 55.
102. See id. at 1191.
103. See id. at 1195-97.
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trial that he will be giving up by pleading guilty and the
range of punishment that the trial court may impose.
Frye and Cooper discourage redefining counsel's role in this
manner. They presuppose that a lawyer will fulfill the ethical du-
ty to provide information that would be important for the defend-
ant to know before deciding whether to plead guilty." Of course,
it might seem unimaginable that a state would attempt to cut
back on indigent defense in this manner, precisely because, as the
Court recognized, plea bargaining has become such a critical stage
of the criminal process. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia's dissent
dares one to imagine this possibility.
III. IS CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Too CLOSE TO
PERFECTION?
The ordinary criminal process has become too long, too expen-
sive, and unpredictable, in no small part as a consequence of
an intricate federal Code of Criminal Procedure imposed on
the States by this Court in pursuit of perfect justice.o5
Justice Scalia did not claim to base his critique on a fact finding
like that which a legislature might undertake, on studies conduct-
ed by others, or on his own personal experience,o" but credited
Judge Friendly's 1965 article with the perception that the ordi-
nary criminal process is presently "too long, too expensive, and
104. Arguably, States achieve essentially the same result in jurisdictions in which pros-
ecutors make "fast track" plea offers. Even if the defense lawyers would be compensated
for conducting investigation and research, the quick expiration of the offer may, as a practi-
cal matter, deprive the lawyers of the time such work requires. See generally Stephanos
Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protec-
tion, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117 (2011); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. 1281 (2010); Jane L. McClellan & Jon M. Sands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
the Policy Paradox of Early Disposition Programs: A Primer on "Fast-Track" Sentences, 38
ARIz. ST. L.J. 517 (2006); Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrong-
ful Convictions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 651 (2007); Ellen S. Podgor, Pleading Blindly, 80
Miss. L.J. 1633 (2011).
105. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. Justice Scalia's past experience did not include work as a lawyer or trial judge in
criminal cases. The only recent Justice with a substantial criminal defense background
was Thurgood Marshall. The one current Justice with substantial criminal justice experi-
ence is Justice Alito, who served as a federal prosecutor. It is noteworthy that Justice Alito
authored a separate dissent in Cooper endorsing the reasoning in the first two Parts of
Justice Scalia's opinion, Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Alito, J., dissenting), rather than join-
ing those portions of the opinion. Perhaps Justice Alito was deterred, if not offended, by
the introductory observations of Justice Scalia's dissent, broadly criticizing the criminal
justice process, with which Justice Alito had been associated for a significant period.
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unpredictable.""o' Justice Scalia's idea of a preferable-and less
perfect-process is evidently a shorter, cheaper and more predict-
able one in which no one, least of all the Supreme Court, tells
states how to adjudicate guilt and innocence except perhaps to
establish minimal, basic procedural protections as a matter of due
process.
It may seem odd that Justice Scalia would attribute his vision of
the "ordinary" criminal process to an article published almost a
half century ago, notwithstanding the author's eminence.0 s Such
reliance might be particularly surprising because decades have
passed since the Warren Court, in decisions such as Gideon v.
Wainwright,'o Miranda v. Arizona,"o and Brady v. Maryland,"'
arguably pursued anything approximating perfection, as opposed
to minimal constitutional fairness, in the criminal context.112 Giv-
en the Court's conservative approach to criminal procedural rights
since at least the 1980s, one's first impression must be that Jus-
tice Scalia is living in the past.
A visit with Judge Friendly's article suggests a further and
more significant reason to be quizzical. Although Judge Friendly
did imagine a procedural landscape resulting from the adoption of
procedural rights in pursuit of justice, it was not the dystopian
landscape that Justice Scalia depicts.
Judge Friendly's article was published during the Warren Court
era, when, as he described, a great debate on criminal procedure
was underway, and various groups were proposing legislation
meant to "strike a fair balance between society's need for protec-
tion against crime and the interests of suspected and accused per-
sons.""s His article cautioned the Supreme Court not to move too
far too fast in setting down constitutional rules of criminal proce-
107. Id. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. See generally DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY, GREATEST JUDGE OF His ERA
(2012).
109. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
110. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
111. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
112. See Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist
Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043 (2006); Louis D. Bilionis, Conservative Reformation,
Popularization, and the Lessons of Reading Criminal Justice As Constitutional Law, 52
UCLA L. REV. 979 (2005); Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Re-
thinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1361 (2004); Anthony O'Rourke, The Political Economy of Criminal Procedure Litigation,
45 GA. L. REV. 721 (2011); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996).
113. Friendly, supra note 7, at 929.
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dure that would restrict state legislative efforts to achieve essen-
tially the same ends in other ways.'14 He never suggested that
Supreme Court decisions had made state criminal processes too
long, expensive or unpredictable in a quest for the procedural ide-
al. He thought the criminal process was not yet sufficiently fair
and he praised the Court's constitutional decisions for making it
fairer, declaring "that there are few brighter pages in the history
of the Supreme Court than its efforts over the past forty years to
improve the administration of justice.""
Judge Friendly's concern was about how to accomplish neces-
sary reform. His conclusion was that additional procedural pro-
tections, while necessary, should in many cases be enacted by
state legislatures."' He made a number of observations. First,
the procedural provisions of the Bill of Rights did not necessarily
have to be applied in precisely the same way in state as in federal
criminal proceedings."' Second, if the Court starts with the view
that these constitutional provisions apply identically in state and
federal cases, then when the Court establishes procedural protec-
tions, it should carefully analyze its basis for doing so. Judge
Friendly noted that the Court has sources of authority available to
it in federal cases, including "its general supervisory power over
the administration of federal justice," that are unavailable in state
criminal cases."s Third, in some areas, such as police interroga-
tion, while there is a demonstrated "need for reform," "the problem
is too complex for [a] sound solution by a constitutional abso-
lute.""' Therefore, "in applying the Bill of Rights to the states, the
Supreme Court should not regard these declarations of fundamen-
tal principles as if they were a detailed code of criminal procedure,
allowing no room whatever for reasonable difference of judgment
114. Id. at 929-31, 953-56.
115. Id. at 930; see also id. at 930-31 (asking, "How can any lawyer not be proud of the
decisions condemning convictions obtained by mob rule, testimony known to the prosecutor
to be peijured, coerced confessions, or trial by magazine?") (internal citations omitted); id.
at 931 (observing, 'There is nigh unanimous applause for the insistence that persons
charged with serious crime shall receive the assistance of counsel at their pleas and trials."
(citing, inter alia, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963))).
116. Id. at 956 (the Court "should welcome the aid that legislatures may now be ready to
offer in discharging the grave responsibilities of the due administration of criminal jus-
tice."); see also id. at 942 (maintaining that reform of police interrogation "is too complex for
sound solution by a constitutional absolute").
117. Id. at 936-38.
118. Id. at 938.
119. Id. at 941-42.
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or play in the joints."120 He concluded: The Supreme Court "happi-
ly does not stand alone. It should welcome the aid that legisla-
tures may now be ready to offer in discharging the grave responsi-
bilities of the due administration of criminal justice."12 1
Against this background, Justice Scalia's invocation of Judge
Friendly's writing seems unjustified on several levels. Judge
Friendly did not criticize ordinary criminal processes for being
overly solicitous of defendants' rights, as Justice Scalia suggested,
but for being insufficiently protective. Nor did Judge Friendly
suggest that additional procedural protections, in the quest for
greater fairness, would create uncertainty or unjustified delay,
expense or other administrative burdens. He did not advocate for
more efficiency and less fairness, as Justice Scalia does. Rather,
Judge Friendly welcomed additional reform. He simply saw legis-
latures as the right institution to enact reform as opposed to a Su-
preme Court interpreting constitutional provisions that did not
lend themselves to the necessary nuance (if not complexity) of
criminal procedure. On the whole, Judge Friendly was proceeding
in a very different spirit from Justice Scalia, who seems to assume
that procedural protections impede and complicate the criminal
justice process. Instead, Judge Friendly welcomed new procedural
protections and restrictions to promote fairness (if not perfection),
some to be established by constitutional interpretation (and, in
federal cases, via other legal sources of authority), and others to be
reserved for legislation.
The overall premise of Judge Friendly's article-namely, that
the Court should not impede state legislative innovation aimed at
making the criminal process more fair-does not argue for a re-
strictive reading of the right to competent representation in cases
such as Cooper and Frye. First, the issue in these cases is not
whether to place new procedural demands on states but whether
to reinforce existing state procedural requirements. That is be-
cause, under Strickland, as previously noted, the expectations for
criminal defense representation in the states are set largely by the
120. Id. at 953-54 (internal citation omitted); see also id. at 954 ("Alternative modes of
arriving at truth are not-they must not be-forever frozen. There is room for growth and
vitality, for adaptation to shifting necessities, for wide differences of reasonable conven-
ience in method.") (internal citation omitted).
121. Id. at 956.
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prevailing norms.122 For example, state court professional stand-
ards required the lawyers in Cooper and Frye to give accurate le-
gal advice and to convey the prosecution's plea offers to the client.
The questions for the Court were whether and, if so, how the Con-
stitution provides a remedy for the lawyers' departure from the
state standards.
Further, there is nothing to suggest that these decisions on the
ineffective assistance of counsel impede state legislative reform.
Remember: Judge Friendly was not worried about all protective
Supreme Court decisions, but only decisions that foreclose alter-
native legislative means to the same end. Cooper and Frye-and
the Strickland line of cases generally-do not impede legislative
innovation and therefore do not represent the kinds of constitu-
tional decisions about which Judge Friendly worried. Indeed, it is
hard to envision what alternatives legislatures might pursue but
cannot.
Finally, to the extent that one shares the concerns actually ex-
pressed by Judge Friendly, there is little evidence to suggest that
constitutional decisions presently impede states from making
criminal justice fairer. Nor is it the case today, as Judge Friendly
believed it was when he was writing, that there is a great legisla-
tive movement to improve the administration of justice with which
constitutional case law might interfere. If anything, the contem-
porary movement on the part of governmental entities is to "inno-
vate" in a manner that erodes procedural protections by exploiting
the leverage afforded by draconian sentences. 123
The misapplication of Judge Friendly's article aside, there are
various reasons to question Justice Scalia's vision of a constitu-
tionally overburdened criminal justice system. First, Justice Scal-
ia's criticism seems particularly unwarranted in the context on
which he focuses-namely, plea bargaining.'24 Even those who
122. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) ("Prevailing norms of practice
as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like .. . are guides to determin-
ing what is reasonable.")
123. See supra Part I.
124. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1393-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
characterized Cooper and Frye as cases involving "bad plea bargaining" and depicted them
as raising the question of whether there is a "constitutional right to effective plea-
bargainers." Id. at 1393. (Scalia, J., dissenting). This description is questionable, however.
Neither case involved inadequacies in plea bargaining. As discussed earlier, Cooper in-
volved erroneous legal advice, while Frye involved the failure to inform the client of infor-
mation - a plea offer - that was important for the defendant to know. Neither involved, for
example, a failure to attempt to plea bargain or a failure to make a persuasive argument to
the prosecutor for leniency. The latter claims, which would involve allegations of "bad plea
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concur that constitutional decisions have made the criminal trial
process overly complicated 25 would not make the same argument
about the plea bargaining process.1 26 The problem is just the op-
posite. 12 7  Particularly in misdemeanor cases, which dominate
state criminal dockets especially in urban settings, the problem is
not that there are too many procedural protections, but rather too
few. As discussed earlier, defendants are pressured to accept dis-
positions offered by the prosecution not only by the harsh possible
outcomes for unsuccessfully asserting trial rights, but by the pos-
sibility of pretrial incarceration and other costs imposed by the
process. 12 8 The lack of adequate defense representation is among
the actual procedural deficiencies. Underfunded criminal defense
lawyers are said to have made a practice of "'meet[ing] 'em and
plead[ing] 'em'-that is, meeting their clients for the first time at
arraignment, receiving and communicating the prosecution's plea
offer at that time, advising the client to accept the offer, standing
beside the client when a guilty plea is entered, and often, hearing
the sentence imposed on the spot.'29 One aspect of the ineffective-
ness of the Strickland jurisprudence is its inability to address this
practice. 130 But even factoring in felony cases that extend beyond
the arraignment, it is hard to understand why Justice Scalia
would regard a criminal process dominated by guilty pleas as be-
ing too long, expensive or unpredictable.
Further, to the extent that the trial process has become more
complicated and less efficient, these changes cannot fairly be
blamed on the constitutional jurisprudence. In the federal crimi-
nal context, the more significant source of expense and delay has
bargaining," would probably be readily dismissed in most cases. Decisions about when and
how to conduct plea negotiations will ordinarily be viewed as strategic decisions within a
defense lawyer's discretion. An argument that the defendant was prejudiced because more
effective representation would have resulted in a lenient plea offer would ordinarily be
rejected as unduly speculative.
125. It seems hard to argue that state criminal prosecutions are impeded in general,
given the commonly perceived problem of over-incarceration. See, e.g., MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
(2010).
126. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12.
127. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
128. See supra Part I.
129. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, The Right to Counsel in Death Penalty and Other Crim-
inal Cases: Neglect of the Most Fundamental Right and What We Should Do About It, 11
J.L. Soc'Y 1, 16-17 (2010).
130. Since misdemeanor defendants are not sentenced to significant imprisonment, they
have little incentive to challenge their convictions, no matter how deficient their lawyers
may have been.
764 Vol. 51
The Right to Plea Bargain
been Congress's adoption of sentencing guidelines that often ne-
cessitate extensive pre-sentence fact-finding efforts."' In any
event, expense and delay are inherent in the judicial resolution of
disputes in the modern era, as the civil justice process amply
demonstrates. One could more legitimately describe the ordinary
civil process as too long, too expensive and unpredictable, causing
parties to seek relief in the settlement process or alternative dis-
pute mechanisms. 132  The problem is undeniably worse in civil
than criminal cases. But the problem in civil litigation owes not a
whit to the Court's development of an intricate constitutional pro-
cedure code in pursuit of perfect justice.
The following thought experiment raises further doubts about
Justice Scalia's assertions: Suppose Justice Scalia sincerely be-
lieves that the ordinary criminal process is too long, expensive and
unpredictable because of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence,
and that it is because of the Court's constitutional decisions that
prosecutors and defense lawyers engage in plea bargaining as an
alternative to trials. Ask yourself, which past decisions expanding
constitutional rights, if overturned, does Justice Scalia believe
would lead to an increase in trials and decrease in plea bargain-
ing? Among the most procedurally burdensome constitutional de-
cisions are two decided under the Confrontation Clause for which
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinions: Crawford v. Washing-
ton 33 and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.'34  But no one has
shown an uptick in plea bargaining resulting from these opinions.
As long as defendants can obtain less harsh results by pleading
guilty and prosecutors can bring harsher charges in order to in-
duce guilty pleas, no judicial curtailment of constitutional protec-
tions will reduce the dominance of plea bargaining.
131. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
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CONCLUSION
The Court's decisions in Cooper and Frye did little more than
preserve and reinforce the status quo. The majority opinions hold
that defendants may have a remedy when they lose out on favora-
ble plea offers because of their lawyers' substantial departures
from established professional standards. The more significant
opinion is Justice Scalia's dissent, which imagines a plea bargain-
ing process in which defense lawyers would have a more constrict-
ed constitutional role. If in 1965 one might have worried about
the Supreme Court's over-eagerness to reform the criminal process
to make it fairer, Justice Scalia's dissent suggests cause for great-
er alarm today: a bloc of Justices seeks to curtail procedural pro-
tections motivated by the spurious premise that criminal justice is
already too close to perfect for its own good.
